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Wednesday, June 26, 2019

Trump Appointee Judge Peter Phipps is Openly Screwing Over the Race Discrimination Case Filed Against Fieldworks

One of the more horrible arguments made by "Bern or Busters" is that the courts don't matter. Well here's one of the new appointees from President Trump: Judge Peter Phipps. While technically he's not a member of the Federalist Society, people who are notoriously quiet on Brown v. Board of Education, Judge Peter Phipps might as well be. Both me and Justin used to work for Fieldworks. We're both suing the organization in the US federal courts over racial discrimination. Fieldworks claimed they fired Justin over "duplicate registrations", which they have yet to produce at any level. That's odd because we took photographs of all of our voter registrations so if they had evidence you would think they would have produced it. While Phipps has ruled in Justin's favor a few times most of the time he has made it impossible for him to win his case, mainly by the fact that Justin's motion for extension was granted, and then mysteriously cancelled. Luckily we have the judge's original order in writing that Judge Phipps conveniently forgot about. In fact, Phipps is running a clinic on how to kill a pro se complaint by moving the case entirely too fast and not granting common sense motions like an extension for discovery.

Yes Justin is interested in any pro bono legal help he can get.

Complete copy of what Justin sent to the Federal Courts.





Plaintiff's Show of Cause or is it a fair choice if the court makes me choose between my job/livelihood and a completely arbitrary court date?

1. Introduction.
By the way, the answer posed by the title here is "no".  Also, and let me be blunt, I no longer believe or think that Judge Peter Phipps is an honest and objective judge, at least for plaintiffs in a civil rights case. He was appointed by President Trump, famous for characterizing neo nazis and old fashioned Klansmen as fine people, and known for being an overall racist and a general loon. (He still won't apologize to the exonerated Central Park Five even though they were cleared by DNA evidence and a confession by the real rapist.) And at times I feel that Judge Phipps has given me that same kind of "very fine" justice. He does no case analysis whatsoever (Shocking for a Stanford man..). He just rules yay or no in, and here's a new word I learned, "threadbare" briefs and sometimes just quotes the opposition attorneys pretty much word for word. For example, if an appeals court ever looks at this, and I'll probably ask them, how did I lose on the question of specific jurisdiction? How did he determine that I didn't prove that conclusively? Good luck finding it. That's what I would expect from a biased right wing judge who hates these kinds of lawsuits.
2. Court and Other Side Told Several Days Before Trial of My Unavailability.
So I suppose a judge with the gall to force me to give up my job for a completely arbitrary court date wants to fine me as well. Two quick arguments: One you're not supposed to fine IFP plaintiffs. Or as it states multiple times in the circuit:
Shilala v. SCI Albion, et al., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95887, *7 (W.D. Pa. 2012) ("Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate with indigent parties.").

And of course I would argue that I don't deserve any sanctions.
Or two: As soon as I found out on Thursday what my schedule would be (See exhibit one.) I told the court to reschedule. You had a full three days to cancel and reschedule. Please don't try to pin the costs on me. I gave you plenty of time to make other arrangements. You had three days. Take some responsibility for your own actions.

2. The Trial Would Have Been A Sham
Even if I had made the "right" choice and lost my job over a completely arbitrary court date, the trial wouldn't have been worth attending. Neither side had enough time to do discovery. The discovery period shouldn't have started until the summary judgment decisions were finalized. This is why the court cancelled the defendant's subpoenas to depose because they weren't timely, unless the court has changed its mind again to help the defendants. Who knows.
The court also seems to be forgetting something in its own statement. Here it is again (Document 101).
On April 24, 2019, this Court entered a second pretrial order at ECF No. 67. Therein, a jury trial in this matter was scheduled for today, June 10, 2019. The trial schedule was further discussed during a telephone status conference on May 21, 2019 and a pretrial conference on May 31, 2019. On June 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion to stay that was denied the same day, re-establishing for the record that a jury trial in this matter was scheduled to begin today, June 10, 2019. ECF No. 96. In spite of the well-established trial date in this matter, Plaintiff failed to appear.

The court conveniently forgets its own May 21st (Document 81) order where it promised this.
Subpoena Handed to a Person at My House and Not Me and Motion to Extend the Discovery by 60 Days, ECF No. 72, are granted. The appropriate order will follow.

So common sense would suggest that I didn't have to prepare for a trial on June 10. A fair judge, even if he meant something other than the plain reading of the words (A reasonable person could conclude that the motion for the extension was granted. Unless the court wanted Discovery to extend beyond a jury verdict.) would have chosen to honor the extension and cancel all post discovery motions (like motions in limine) until discovery was completed. Just out of a sense of fairness and to avoid prejudice. But not our Phipps.
3. Poulis Factors Exonerate Me.
I don't write this for the judge. I no longer think he's objective. I think Phipps is a federalist society hack. He certainly doesn't deserve a promotion to the appeals court. He doesn't even deserve to be on the bench. I write this for the appeals court.
Here's a list of the Poulis Factors from Hildebrand vs. Allegheny County:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

I will answer these one at a time..
One (extent). I just started the job a month ago and unlike a federal lifetime court appointment I have to perform and can not take off three days whenever I want to do court things. At least not if I want to keep my job. I got my schedule Thursday. I told them Friday. I warned the court that this could happen and made many attempts to get extensions. (An appeals court can take a look at the minutes of our hearings. I made many objections.) Two (prejudice): The court date was completely arbitrary and needed to be set aside according to Judge Phipps own order granting the extension. The other side hadn't even completed discovery yet. 3. (dilatoriness). Not only do I have a habit of showing up, when I'm not working, but I've had to put statements back into the record that the court tried to illegally throw out, claiming wildy that there were certain Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that I wasn't allowed to use. I simply lacked the ability to be in two places at once for the trial. Also one incident of lateness wouldn't cut as it states in Burden v. Yate 1981: "missing one deadline as a result of a miscommunication--simply doesn't create a record of intentional delay." People who have been found wanting or in violation of the Poulis factors are people who have ignored their cases for several months to several years. I haven't done that and gave the court a three day warning that I would be unavailable for, quite frankly, a fraudulent trial. 4. (willful and bad faith). Am I at fault for the schedule given to me by my boss? Am I acting in bad faith when I immediately tell you about it the day after so that you can you cancel the date and save your money? I think not. 5. (sanctions). I don't believe sanctions are warranted. I'm not at fault. No one should have to choose between their job and an arbitrary court date, that should have never happened under the judge's own orders (see document 81). 6. (meritoriousness). I already beat a summary judgment motion which never should have been held before discovery started and ended! I was told when I was fired that I was guilty of duplicate registrations. These registrations have never been produced as evidence. If I ever got a full discovery period, not one where I had to concentrate on trying to keep the case from ending while attempting to do discovery while working or looking for work, then I'm sure I could learn whether this evidence exists or not. Judge Phipps has done everything possible, including ignoring one of his own orders, to make sure that I could never find out for sure. Judge Peter Phipps is really an active member of the defense, not a neutral or objective "judge".
4. Conclusion.
One of the most horrifying things Phipps has said is that he doesn't believe, because of a Supreme Court decision, in the right to discovery. Now I haven't read a lot of cases, but if that was the norm of the federal courts (And let me guess: rich people and corporations would get full discovery and poor people and minorities wouldn't, kind of like now.) the federal courts would turn into the People's Court. There can be no trials or real justice without real discovery. The extension I asked for was minor and should have been granted, and was. I'll let the appeals court do its job. One final note: any objective look at the 100 or so documents filed in this case, including my own statement of facts, should be ample proof that I have attempted to prosecute my own case. I would hope that would be clear.

Exhibit One



Update: Justin was wrong about saying that Phipps based his decision on no right to discovery on a Supreme Court decision. Apparently, that's just what Phipps thinks. Justin disputes that he was informed that the extension was cancelled. Only way to be sure though is to take a listen to the court audio, but Phipps statement definitely contradicts what was written on May 21st. Here's the court statements published by Phipps himself.




Friday, April 19, 2019

Reminder: I can now self publish paperbooks on Amazon. Even do comics.

I got this in an email because I've already self published a few things. This is a reminder. I plan to use these tools very very soon.


Formatting feature updates with Kindle Create
 
Kindle Create helps you transform your manuscript into a professional book through features like book themes (templates), image placement, instant previews, automatic chapter title detection and more. The launch of the following new formatting features will help you to more easily format and publish your eBook and paperback books.

What's New:
  • Paperback (Early Access): You can now create a Kindle eBook and paperback with the same Kindle Create manuscript. Kindle Create lets you create a paperback of any trim size without any additional effort, and also takes care of complicated paperback formatting tasks like margins and page numbering.
  • Table of Contents (TOC) creation: Add a TOC page in addition to a Kindle Table of Contents (sometimes also called NCX) to your book in just a few clicks. The TOC page automatically adapts to digital or print – your eBook contains a TOC page with hyperlinks and a TOC in a paperback contains page numbers.
  • Image features: Kindle Create makes it easy to insert images and specify their placement on a page by controlling the size and position on a page. You can also set your image to extend to the edge of the screen as a Kindle Create Early Access feature.   
  • Comics with Guided View (Early Access): You can create a comic eBook using a PDF and add Comixology Guided View panels. Comixology Guided View allows readers to view a comic on a panel-by-panel basis in a way that mimics the natural motion of the user's eye through the comic. Individual pages can be added or deleted from your Kindle Create book, making it easy to make changes.
Get Started with Kindle Create

Saturday, February 16, 2019

#TheBlacklist Had no idea General Shiro was real. Also hope that insects can't blossom and grow inside your body.

As horrible as that imagery was, something the Joker could take notes on and emulate its just so bad, what the main villain was fighting against was actually much much worse. Large scale pesticide adoption kind of like what the Trump administration is pushing for. More information about General Shiro. He was the Japanese version of Mengele. Maybe worse. Known as "The Devil's Doctors". Not sure if he ever did that insect thing or if it's even possible. Shock ending: The US recruited the general into our own bioweapons program. He lived out his final years in the USA. He could have been your neighbor in some quiet suburb. Great episode.

By the way, the case against Elisabeth Wheeler, attorney Donna Glover and Pivot Physical Therapy continues.

Monday, January 14, 2019

Long Intimate Imaginary Relationship with Elizabeth Warren Threatened by AOC on Temptation Island

This is why I'm in a long term and intimate imaginary relationship with Elizabeth Warren. She also excels in these kinds of settings and she's right. OTOH I'm on temptation island with AOC, tempting me her with nearly nekkid island dance, wearing scant black widow/catwoman leather and a shimmering rorshack mask...I-I must say no. Oh no she's quoting Promethea, Black Summer, Deep Space Nine and Greg Egan as I start running toward her, heart racing, my manhood stirred...




Saturday, November 03, 2018

Newest court filing against Fieldsworks, Chris Gallaway, and Zachary Reider, worst canvass director in the world and: Why aren't these guys in jail?

I think its the white privilege thing again. Because I'm pretty certain that as a black man I would be in jail for doing the same thing.

Clearly, Fieldworks and Zachary Reider, probably under the instruction of Chris Gallaway or other managers (Need discovery to pin that down absolutely...) clearly broke the State of Pennsylvania's rule against quotas for voter registration forms. What's worse they used that standard in a discriminatory way by making sure that blacks had to reach a higher quota. Anyway, here's the latest court filing where I don't mention any of that stuff but its still annoying.





Brief Response to Defendant's Sept. 26th Statement

1. I think I described their statement of Sept. 26th as being "weak tea" to opposing council and I stand by this.
2. But I do want to offer a very brief response. So here's a few points:
3.  I kind of wish I had been granted the original extension that I asked for. I'm answering this within 35 days because the defendant's statements are part of dispositive motion. But I still would like more time. I feel this affects my case in a very negative way. For example the deadline for responding to this brief and the brief in the other case on the exact same day. Or today. Not fair.
4. All of the problems that Defendants complain about can be solved with an amended complaint. This is where I use the specific examples of what I meant in the original complaint in the following response briefs in the amended complaint. I can also make sure that I clearly state what Section 1981 does but I assumed since yinz guys were lawyers that you already knew. I just need an afternoon or two to do that. Would gladly do it if necessary.
5. Or the court could use the "common sense' instruction that its supposed to use in 12 b 6 cases and assume that the Defendants already understand what they have to rebut, by now (such as direct testimony that Zachary Reider is a racist by five black persons and possibly one white employee as well.) and we can simply move on to discovery. I think I used the phrase "obscenely obtuse" in another legal document. That would be the case here if there was a demand for an amended complaint but I could still write one. Might take two afternoons who knows. They know by now what has to be rebutted.
6. Its clear that Zachary Reider is an employer or proxy of an employer which means that he's the kind of guy that has to abide by Section 1981. Or I was fired by a ghost. Some kind of imaginary being. There were no other managers at Fieldworks at the time.
7. I don't have to prove a prima facie case at this stage. See the appeals court decision Sandra Connelly v. Lane Construction Corporation:
It is thus worth reiterating that, at least for purposes of pleading sufficiency, a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss.6 A prima facie case is “an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement,” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002), and hence is “not a proper measure of whether a complaint fails to state a claim.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2009)

8. We may ask for a hearing so that these issues can be ironed out.

Respectfully submitted,
Philip Shropshire
Signature
10-31-18



Certificate of Service

I have mailed out this statement on Oct. 31st, 2018 to the court by way of UPS. I will email a copy of this statement to opposing counsel in the next day or two.

Wednesday, September 05, 2018

Court Response Where I Call Pivot Physical Therapy Supervisor Elisabeth Wheeler and her counsel Donna Glover Inveterate Liars

I call Elisabeth Wheeler and her attorney Donna Glover inveterate liars because they lie all the time. In fact, they lie, kind of like our current orange skinned president, when they really don't have to lie. I think its just their first option. Anyway, when I have more time I'll add to this. Here's the latest that I sent to the court.


Philip Shropshire    
Pro Se


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT

Philip Shropshire,
                    Plaintiff,
          vs.
Elisabeth Wheeler
Pivot Physical Therapy
                    Defendants
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Case No.: No. 2 18 cv 221 DSC

Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Aug 8th Statement, Local Rule 7E argument for August 20th extension and query to the Court: Does the Court want me to write an Amended Complaint?





Preface

While I'm limited by the demands of my very grueling physical job -- I walk three to five miles a day in 90 degree plus heat several days a week (With Pgh hills and steps its not unlike being on a stairmaster for three hours straight while in a sauna...)  -- and the fact that I'm now juggling two lawsuits instead of one -- I believe I have a right under Rule 7 to file a response within 21, or even 35 days on a dispositive motion. But just to play it safe I think 21 days ends on August 29th. And there was so much that was wrong with Donna Glover's August 8th statement to this court that it quite frankly demands a response. There has been no response to the extension that I asked for or the motion to strike asked for by defendant's counsel. So I usually assume the worst and that 21 or 35 days is all that I get. But I would love that extension under local Rule 7e so I could be more thorough and scrutinize every dot and every t of Donna Glover's August 8th statement. Unless the court were to grant my wish and strip both PHRA and Title VII (They're not needed. You can do retaliation and disparate treatment and mixed motive cases just fine under Section 1981. In fact you can do more. I'm not sure why I'm supposed to by angry about that. Or even care.)

I'm going to briefly address three arguments. One, we're going to argue that my August 20th motion for an extension is clearly allowed under Local Rule 7E. Two, we believe that the Reyes vs. Autozone Inc. case is the most on point case for going forward where Title VII and PHRA were time barred but the valid Section 1981 claim continued and where the plaintiff was allowed discovery to attempt to prove his case. (Decisions that weren't rendered until after Discovery and only at the summary judgment stage. ) Three, we're going to talk a little bit more about civility and explain the factual basis behind our meat and potatoes disparate treatment case. They're overwhelming and are, for the most part, already proven by the Defendant's own 20 page EEOC statement. My arguments aren't "conclusionary" but based on the facts within the Defendant's own very flawed statements and my own experiences at Pivot.

So. Let us begin again.

I. Local Rule 7E allows for a one time extension for all parties. Let's quote the rule here:

E. Stipulations. The parties, without Court approval, may file a stipulation one time which extends for a period not to exceed 45 days from the original due date the time for filing either an answer to a complaint or a motion pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12

There really shouldn't be any problem with me asking for such a request. I don't even ask for the full 45 days.

II. We have no problem with Title VII or the PHRA being stripped. Section 1981 claim is still valid and relies on the same methodology and the case can proceed. I thought that should be in bold.

A.)  When I was back on the debate team in college (eons ago) we used a simple technique. Any argument that wasn't challenged by the other side was a win for us. The case that wasn't brought up or challenged in any way was Reyes vs. Autozone Inc, where the Title VII and PHRC were time barred but the Section 1981 claim was valid and it continued.  That's also the case with Ejikeme v. PA Dept of Transportation. Not the exact same case law with Ejikeme but the common sense approach of barring claims that aren't allowed and allowing claims that are valid, like Section 1981 in this case, to continue. It should be noted that those conclusions were made in that case during the summary judgment phase and after Discovery and not beforehand. Go figure. Or you can go to the online database of Casetext and find 1000 plus cases featuring motions denied or motions affirmed. This isn't really a controversial view. Yes we know defendants take a crack at this in pages 9 though but they fail horribly. These issues can be fully addressed if my Aug. 20th extension is granted.

III. Let's talk briefly about "Civility" and why I think Attorney Donna Glover and her client Pivot Physical Therapy Supervisor Elizabeth Wheeler are both inveterate liars.

This has to be discussed a bit more fully.

A.) Let's address these concerns about "civility". Like in most writing people tend to bury the really interesting stuff in the footnotes. Here's one such statement although I'm not sure if a pro se plaintiff can effectively be threatened with sanctions"

Throughout the course of his Opposition, Shropshire referred to the undersigned defense counsel as “arrogant,” “kinda dumb,” and “lackluster, poorly briefed clowns.” (Shropshire Opp. at 5, 10). Shropshire also suggested that the undersigned defense counsel are incapable of reading, are “silly and full of lies,” and are “desperate.” (Id. at 10, 16) Although Shropshire is not a member of the bar, and thus not held to the same standards of conduct, he should nonetheless conduct himself before this Court in a manner that respects and treats everyone with civility, including the Defendants and their counsel. Counsel for Defendants therefore requests that Shropshire refrain from this behavior going forward.

Yeah, well, respect is earned not granted. Look, its not that I mind that you lie to me. Its clear that you and your client think that I'm a dumb darkie who doesn't know when white people are lying to his face. Fair enough. What I find, uh, well, "kinda dumb" and "arrogant" is lying to the court. This judge is learned but even if he weren't he has researchers and other legal minds to help guide him. So you should never lie about cases that Judge Cercone actually worked on. For example, in a paragraph that is kind of one big lie in itself (More on that paragraph later if I get that extension.) you state this on page 17 of your August 8th statement:

Second, case law from throughout the Third Circuit, and this Court in particular, is replete with examples of complaints that were factually deficient on their face and were dismissed as a matter of law prior to discovery. Of course, many of these cases were employment discrimination cases and involved pro se plaintiffs, some of which were decided by this very Court. See, e.g., Koger v. Robert Half International, 247 Fed. Appx. 349 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming Judge Cercone’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim before discovery);

Yet Cercone wrote a case management order that included Discovery. There was an exhibit plan that was as released. This is one of Cercone's orders, which you can read at the PACER datebase.

DISCOVERY AND PRETRIAL DEADLINES IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with Local Rule 16.1 shall be completed as follows: 1) The parties shall move to amend the pleadings or add new parties by January 9, 2006. 2) All fact and expert discovery shall be completed by February 7, 2006. All written discovery shall be initiated in sufficient time to permit responses to be completed and depositions to be taken in compliance with all applicable deadlines. 3) Plaintiff’s pretrial narrative statement shall be filed on or before March 9, 2006, and comply with Local Rule 16.1.4A. Case 2:05-cv-00850-DSC Document 14 Filed 10/07/05 Page 1 of 5 -2- Counsel shall specify all material facts to be proved at trial and identify all exhibits to be used in the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. Proof of facts not specified or exhibits not identified may be excluded at trial upon objection or by the court sua sponte. 4) Defendants’ pretrial narrative statement shall be filed on or before April 7, 2005, and comply with Local Rule 16.1.4B. Counsel shall specify all material facts to be proved at trial and identify all exhibits to be used in the defendants’ case-in-chief. Proof of facts not specified or exhibits not identified may be excluded at trial upon objection or by the court sua sponte.

5) Counsel shall confer and complete the attached pretrial stipulation on or before April 17, 2006. 6) All dispositive motions shall be filed on or before May 17, 2006.

And if you look at Exhibit Two you find that Koger was actually deposed! This would suggest a discovery period. It also means that defendant's counsel is either incompetent or she told a big fat lie. Probably both. Perhaps this is an example of someone being "poorly briefed" or "lackluster" Now, its one thing to want more discovery after you've been granted a discovery period but its another thing to entirely claim that no discovery period ever occurred. And I'm pretty sure that's a lie. How is that not a lie? And as long as you and your clients lie, I'm going to call out your lies.

B.) The Defendant's EEOC statement, written by Attorney Donna Glover, is full of lies.

This is Exhibit One. I'm putting the whole 20 pages into the record. Here are  just the lies on page 2 of that statement. Some of my claims can be proven with a discovery period. Some are already proven by the lack of any progressive discipline record. Why are lies important? Because, according to analysis by the Boston Employment Blog and written jury instructions for Title VII and Section 1981 discrimination cases:


 "... “the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.” The Court further stated that “once the employer’s justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.” 

Now this is just page two of that 20 page statement but Donna Glover and Elizabeth Wheeler lied about me being late for work on my second day. I was given a span to arrive between 7 and 7 15 am. I arrived in the lot by 7 15 am or possibly 7 14 am. The vehicle was long gone. I didn't even catch it pulling out. I got there on time. But there are cameras  and I would be happy to look at the tape. Something I wouldn't want to do if I was lying. We need discovery for that. Both Donna Glover and Elizabeth Wheeler are lying about me violating the dress code. I wore sweatpants underneath my approved of slacks mainly because I used to walk home in 10 degree weather and didn't want to freeze off my essential bits. That's not a violation. Both Donna Glover and Elizabeth Wheeler are lying when they say I violated rules about submitting time sheets. According to April Bibars you could do it one of two ways: you could submit the sheets electronically or you could hand deliver them. I tried electronic delivery at first. But the Pivot computer systems couldn't read my documents even though my home computers could. But I never violated any orders by doing it that way. Under section five on page two, at least one of those occasions was when they sent me to the wrong address which made me late although without discovery how they define "late" or whether white workers were treated to the same standards isn't actually clear. (The other one was when they didn't tell me when my work day started. Usually I have to call the day before.)   Also keep in mind the progressive discipline that they have. It wasn't used in just about every one of these situations. You're supposed to use it if I gamble on the premises or  bring a gun to work. A verbal warning, then a written one. I got nuthin'. (Their suggested use of the progressive discipline rules.) On page two, third graph, that begins "On at least one occasion" both Donna Glover and Elizabeth Wheeler are lying when they claim "Mr. Shropshire disappeared during the workday". You know why that's a lie? Because I usually carried two cell phones on me. They knew where I was at all times and could reach me at all times. Sometimes trips were cancelled. I usually knew while driving. Hey its the future. You're never away from "work" with cell phones. I've been called while in the bathroom. They also mention, on page 5, that I committed the crime of going to the grocery while forgetting to mention that I had a lunch break and had to occasionally use the bathroom. The East End Coop is actually underneath Pivot. These are just awful dimwitted lies uttered by, I'm presuming,  a desperate Elizabeth Wheeler and sanctioned by an equally desperate Donna Glover. Frankly, they'll be disproved within 90 seconds of a deposition with any other driver. I just hope I can get a discovery period.
And that's just pages two and five. So when I say this in my initial complaint:

11. Plaintiff believes he was fired for his race for a host of pretextual reasons including but not limited to: lying in wait, post hoc rationalizations, using a hypercritical standard not applied to white workers,  treating white workers better and holding them to a lesser standard, false information in defendant's EEOC position statement and a whole bunch of "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions" as written by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. Co. , 185 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999). We plan to save Pivot's unsigned evaluation, a two page parade of pretext, presented to the EEOC but never before seen by me, for either a rebuttal or perhaps even an amended complaint.

These aren't "conclusionary". These are facts that I derive from Pivot Physical Therapy's own EEOC statement, which I described as "silly and full of lies". I stand by that statement. And whenever Donna Glover or Elizabeth Wheeler lies, whether its court statements or to my face, I'm going to call them liars. To their faces. I don't know if lawyers can be sanctioned for lying all the time. Perhaps the judge would consider that "redundant" and "moot". After seeing Donna Glover in action I would get that.

Conclusion:

I would also hope that the court would see that there are enough sufficient facts about the case to proceed to a discovery period. I was using shorthand for pretext before in describing the incidents. I hope this adds a bit more detail and depth.

Just for the record these are the kinds of pretext that are evident from Pivot's EEOC statement and my own observations:

Unattainable goals (Being on time when the destination is wrong.)
No opportunity to finish work improvement plan.
Suspect documentation (Using desk files and unsigned evaluations to prove alleged work deficiencies that were never mentioned to me when I worked there.)
Papering the file and hypercritical (A dirty shirt? Really? That's an offense to be fired for? Or just niggers?)
Failure to follow policies as typically applied (Take Pivot's progressive discipline policy, please.)
False statements to EEOC and other agencies (Take Pivot's EEOC statement, please.)
Not my job (To get the addresses right.)
Reasons just make no sense (You supplied the wrong address not me. That's what made me late. Whatever that means.)
Lying in wait
Post Hoc rationalizations (Didn't receive a single client complaint while working at Pivot now there's a bunch of them. Contradicted even by their own unsigned evaluation.)
Weaknesses, implausibilities, incoherencies or contradictions (See all of the above.)



Any one of these should beat summary judgment and get me a jury trial. But its not just the one thing. This case is wide and deep even before discovery. And if a shark like Cordes or O Brien were to get this case in front of a jury then your company is looking at extinction. Those are just the kinds of pretext I have time to list.

Are these enough facts for the court or is an amended complaint still needed? I can't tell if Attorney Donna Glover is being purposely obtuse or is just dim wittedly obtuse, or some  awful combination of incompetence or stupidity or if she's just lying, yet again, when she says there are not facts in the case. Ms. Glover lies so much of course so who knows. I respect the competence and intelligence of this court and this judge. I have always been treated more than fairly. I have no respect for the aptitude or competence of Ms. Donna Glover, who as Pivot's attorney made their case much worse with that EEOC statement full of lies and error.


Respectfully submitted,
Signed:
Philip Shropshire
pshropshire@yahoo.com
www.threeriversonline.com
8-29-18

Friday, June 01, 2018

Full Initial Complaint of Philip Shropshire v. Elisabeth Wheeler and Pivot Physical Therapy

So it looks like this case is beginning to start. Generally, its never about the work where I lose these jobs. Usually it has to do with being uppity. Or perceived as being uppity. That usually means a black person speaking in complete sentences. Anyway, I'm thinking of using Elisabeth of Pivot Therapy, Zachary Reider of Fieldworks (A company whose behavior during the lawsuit has been nothing short of bizarre. It looks like they're trying to ignore the civil suit and risk a default judgement. I'm okay with that....) and Donald Trump as examples of really bad bosses. They could all be described as insecure (Elisabeth Wheeler was too cowardly to even show me my evaluation. I didn't see it until I read Pivot's EEOC statement.), mediocre, dimwitted sociopaths. Just my opinion. And, if the revolution comes,  I truly believe that the at will system should be replaced with just cause and progressive discipline.

Anyway here's the initial complaint which was finally filed and accepted by the court.










IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA


Philip Shropshire         Civil Action No:

vs.

Elisabeth Wheeler
Pivot Physical Therapy (Formerly known as Allegheny Chesapeake)


JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

PRO SE CIVIL COMPLAINT



1. Jurisdiction

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S. Code § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the amended Civil Rights Act of 1991, as well as Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act or the PHRA. We are filing under the counts of discrimination based on race.

2. The plaintiff has satisfied all procedural and administrative prerequisites to sue under the PHRA, Title VII and 42 U.S. Code § 1981, He received his right to sue letter on Nov. 23, 2017 from the EEOC for the permission to sue Elizabeth Wheeler and Allegheny Chesapeake rehabilitation, since bought out by Pivot Rehabilitation.  The complaint also is also timely under Section 1981 which gives you four years to file a complaint after the termination date. (May 2016).

3. Defendants Elizabeth Wheeler and Fieldworks are employers under Title VII, PHRA and 42 USC 1981. It's also a defense they never attempted in their somewhat voluminous 20 page statement that was sent to the EEOC. (Please place that into the record here as well. I understand there are perjury laws that can be enforced under this venue. And they shall be.)

II Venue

4. We believe the venue is proper because defendants have resided and/or conducted business in this judicial district and/or because all of the acts giving rise to the claims set forth herein occurred in this judicial district.

III. Parties

5. Plaintiff Philip Shropshire is an African American male who resides at 740 Franklin Avenue, Pgh. PA 15221.

6. Defendant Pivot Technology have an office at 7501 Penn Avenue, Pgh. PA 15208.  Defendant Elisabeth Wheeler works at that office, last time I checked online. We are naming Elisabeth Wheeler as a defendant and we're suing her in both her professional and personal capacity.

IV. Factual Background

7. Paragraphs one through six are incorporated herein by reference as though set in full.

8. I received an offer letter Feb. 8  2016. from the then Allegheny Chesapeake which also included an employee handbook. My last day of employment was May 31st, 2016. I was hired as kind of an in house taxi driver who delivered patients to and from the Penn Avenue clinic and back to their homes. The employment handbook I was given with my acceptance letter included a four prong test. In their voluminous 20 page letter to the EEOC it is clear that I never reached sanction three and its debatable that I ever reached sanction two or in many cases even sanction one. What's also missing from their EEOC statement is that I successfully completely anywhere from 70 to 100 delivery trips without error or complaint. My time sheets, which proves this, are mysteriously missing from their exhibit list. We will certainly ask for them in any discovery process. I believe I was the lone African American that worked for them in any capacity.

9. I believe I was fired over the phone, always a classy move and never leads to lawsuits, about a week after May 31st, for an incident that was clearly the fault of Elisabeth Wheeler and the then named Allegheny Chesapeake. Wheeler, or one of her employees, gave me the wrong address for a client and then blamed me for being late! In fact, after reading through Pivot's EEOC statement its probable that their motivations were premeditated and had nothing to with my work record. Or even that event. In fact, to put this in a non legal way, I was most likely fired for being an uppity negro, which I'm proud of, but which I also don't think is grounds for legal termination under prevailing civil rights law.

Count 1
Title VII, PHRA and Section 1981
Race Discrimination

10. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 9.

11. Plaintiff believes he was fired for his race for a host of pretextual reasons including but not limited to: lying in wait, post hoc rationalizations, using a hypercritical standard not applied to white workers,  treating white workers better and holding them to a lesser standard, false information in defendant's EEOC position statement and a whole bunch of "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies or contradictions" as written by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. Co. , 185 F.3d 1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999). We plan to save Pivot's unsigned evaluation, a two page parade of pretext, presented to the EEOC but never before seen by me, for either a rebuttal or perhaps even an amended complaint.

12. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Philip Shropshire demands judgment pursuant to Title VII, Section 1981 and the PHRA as follows, included but not limited to:

  1. That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for the full value of wages he would have received had it not been for the Defendant's illegal treatment of Plaintiff with interest since his termination in May 2016.

  1. That Defendants be required to provide Plaintiff with front pay if the court decides reinstatement is not feasible. (I would only want to be reinstated under contract with clear definitions of work responsibilities, and with an enshrined code of progressive discipline (enforced this time.), as well as clear First Amendment Rights, not to mention compensatory damages being paid upfront.)

  1. That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for lost benefits, including profit sharing and/or pension benefits until Plaintiff’s normal retirement date. That defendants be awarded compensatory damages of at least $35,000 or an amount to be determined at trial.

  2. That Defendants be ordered to pay, each, $1.5 million dollars in punitive damages or an amount to be determined at trial.

  1. That Pro Se Plaintiff be awarded against Defendant the costs and expenses of this litigation.

  1. That Plaintiff be granted such further legal and equitable relief as the Court may deem just and proper.




Summary

13. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 12 as if fully restated.

14. I look forward to seeing the rebuttal by Defendants. It will be thoroughly debunked, probably line by line.








Respectfully submitted,

Pro Se Plaintiff Philip Shropshire

(I edited out my personal address and phone number.)


2 21 2018

*Note to the court again: We will send papers to defendants to waive service within the next week or so.




Friday, October 13, 2017

The Amended Complaint Against Fieldworks, Chris Gallaway and Zachary Reider

Still working to get this lawsuit on track. Not sure about the criminal complaints against Fieldworks. But they did use quotas in violation of state law. I know that for a fact because I helped prepare the EEOC complaints for the two women that Zachary Reider fired for not making quota. Whenever the state attorney general's office or local DA Stephen Zappala wants that information they just have to contact me at pshropshire@yahoo.com.

Anyway, here's the amended complaint:



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Philip Shropshire
Plaintiff,
v.
Chris Gallaway, Zachary Reider, Fieldworks Inc.
Defendant.
No.  17-935
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, JURY TRIAL DEMANDED



AMENDED COMPLAINT


PREFACE

1. We wish to amend some clerical errors that we missed in the first complaint. But in my defense Gallaway's second "A" did look like an "O" to my aging eyes.

2. We wish to strip the Whistleblower Claim entirely and refile it in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas or some other appropriate state court of choice. Apparently, if I were to file it at the federal level I would not be allowed to remand it to state court later. So better safe than sorry. And: the law is hard.

3. We make this amended complaint under federal rule 15(a).

4. We still await the court's decision on my in forma pauperis request. (See court docket.) Also: Still quite poor if anyone's asking.




JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

AMENDED CIVIL COMPLAINT


I. Jurisdiction


1. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the state of Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act or the PHRA. We are filing under the counts of discrimination and retaliation.

2. The plaintiff has satisfied all procedural and administration prerequisites to sue under the PHRA, Title VII and the 42 U.S.C. §1981. He received his right to sue letter on April 17th from the EEOC for the permission to sue Zachary Reider and the Fieldworks Corporation. The complaint is also timely under Section §1981, which gives you four years to file a complaint after the termination date. (July 2016)

3. Defendants Chris Gallaway, Zachary Reider and Fieldworks are employers under Title VII, PHRA and 42 U.S.C. §1981.

II. Venue

4. We believe the venue is proper because defendants have resided or conducted business in this judicial district or because all of the acts giving rise to the claims set forth herein occurred in this judicial district.

III. Parties

5. Plaintiff Philip Shropshire is an African American male who resides at 740 Franklin Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15221

6. Defendants Fieldworks had an office at 321 Pennwood Avenue, Pgh. PA, where I interviewed and worked for about a month and a half. We are also naming Chris Gallaway and Zachary Reider as defendants. We are suing them both in their professional and personal capacities.

IV. Factual Background

7. Paragraphs 1 through 6 are incorporated herein by reference as though set in full.


8. Plaintiff began working for Defendant
in June 2016. I was either the first or second person hired and was promoted within the first several weeks to a field manager position along with an increase in pay. Plaintiff received not one complaint from Joel Williams, the African American manager who hired and promoted me. In fact, I was praised by Joel in front of the entire office for registering over 500 voters. Our staff, at times, was the most productive office in the state. The staff was 90 percent black with just a handful of white workers.


9. Unfortunately, Joel left for a better opportunity and was replaced by new manager Zachary Reider, who is white. I lost my job not because I couldn’t canvass, but because I was engaging in protected speech and urging the new white canvass director to not break the law. Fun fact: Several Fieldworks offices were eventually raided and the criminal investigations from the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s office are still ongoing. And, of course, even though I had given Reider links to the old news stories, quoted him the exact statute, he then proceeded to fire at least two black workers for not making quota anyway. Under state statute, you can’t fire voter registration workers over quotas, or at least that’s what DA Stephen Zappala argued publicly those many years ago. Two Fieldworks employees, including me, did file a criminal complaint against Zachary Reider and at the time assistant DA Richard Heister agreed that there was a valid criminal claim but we have not heard back from the county. You can read about one of the raids from the state, not connected to the county charges as far as I know, here:



Count 1
Title VI, PHRA and Section 1981
Race Discrimination


10. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 9.

11. Plaintiff believes he was fired because of his race for a host of pretextual reasons including but not limited to shifting explanations, post hoc rationalizations, treating white workers better and holding them to lesser standards, false information in defendants EEOC position statement and an overall pattern of racial discrimination in firing decisions, up to and including violating state criminal law. There's also should be direct testimony that Zachary Reider is a racist, probably from every person of color that worked with him here in Pittsburgh.

12. WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff Philip Shropshire demands judgment pursuant to Title VII, Section 1981 and the PHRA as follows:

A.)        That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for the full value of wages he would have received had it not been for the Defendants illegal treatment of Plaintiff, with interest since his termination in July 2016.
B.)        That Defendants be required to provide Plaintiff with front pay if the court decides reinstatement is not feasible. (I would only want to be reinstated under contract with clear definitions of work responsibilities, and with an enshrined code of progressive discipline, as well as clear first amendment rights, not to mention compensatory damages being paid upfront.)
C.)        That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for lost benefits, including profit sharing and/or pension benefits until Plaintiff’s normal retirement date.
D.)        That Plaintiffs be awarded compensatory damages of at least $35,000 or an amount to be determined at trial.
E.)        That Defendants be ordered to pay, each, $1 million dollars in punitive damages or an amount to be determined at trial.
F.)        That Pro Se Plaintiff be awarded against Defendant the costs and expenses of this litigation.
G.)        That Plaintiff be granted such further legal and equitable relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Count II
Title VII,PHRA and Section 1981: Retaliation


13. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 12.

14. Plaintiff believes he was retaliated against by Defendants after using protected speech, both in defending fellow black workers from being terminated illegally and also in violation of the state’s Whistleblower Law. Plaintiff was clearly not “disruptive” in any way, shape or form as a worker or a field manager nor could that be interpreted to mean informing your boss, a college kid from Idaho, that he was breaking state law. And could he please not do that. Zachary Reider may have worked for Bernie Sanders but he ran that office pretty much like Donald Trump: just a toxic brew of arrogance, stupidity and incompetence. I believe I have written publicly that Reider is the worst canvass director I have ever worked for in my 30 years of canvassing, including the one that got fired for embezzlement. I stand by that statement. He has earned no less than five civil rights complaints to the EEOC. And those are just the ones I know of.

15. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Philip Shropshire demands judgment pursuant to Title VII, Section 1981, and the PHRA as follows:


A.) That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for the full value of wages he would have received had it not been for the Defendants illegal treatment of Plaintiff, with interest since his termination in July 2016.
B.) That Defendants be required to provide Plaintiff with front pay if the court decides reinstatement is not feasible. (I would only want to be reinstated under contract with clear definitions of work responsibilities, and with an enshrined code of progressive discipline, as well as clear first amendment rights, not to mention compensatory damages being paid upfront.)
C.) That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for lost benefits, including profit sharing and/or pension benefits until Plaintiff’s normal retirement date.
D.) That Defendants be required to compensate Plaintiff for lost benefits, including profit sharing and/or pension benefits until Plaintiff’s normal retirement date. That Plaintiff be awarded compensatory damages of at least $35,000 or an amount to be determined at trial.
E.) That Defendants be ordered to pay, each, $1 million dollars in punitive damages or an amount to be determined at trial.
F.) That Pro Se Plaintiff be awarded against Defendant the costs and expenses of this litigation.
F.) That Plaintiff be granted such further legal and equitable relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

Summary and Implications of the Ongoing Criminal Investigation Into Fieldworks by the Pennsylvania Attorney General

16. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 15 as if fully restated.

17. Since the criminal investigation against Fieldworks hasn’t been concluded by the State Attorney General’s office I wouldn’t object, once service has been completed or waived, at waiting until those efforts have been concluded or no more than 1 month from the date this claim is filed. We certainly wouldn’t want, say, a statement made under deposition here, to lead to a criminal conviction in that case. Perish the thought.

Respectfully submitted,

Pro Se Plaintiff Philip Shropshire

pshropshire@yahoo.com
(home contact info deleted)
8-3-17


*Note to the court again: We will send papers to defendants to waive service within the next week or so.



And here 's the proof that it was filed. Its hard to get PDF's to copy here so....